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Toxic torts:  arsenic poisoning in Bangladesh and the legal geographies of 
responsibility 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Tubewells have been so popular in rural Bangladesh that about 12 million have been 
installed, yielding water that is convenient, free, and low in bacteria.  But every fourth 
well is polluted with arsenic, with the result that millions of people are exposed to a 
severe environmental hazard.  We explore this crisis from the viewpoint of legal 
geographies.  The case of Sutradhar v NERC is taken as an exemplar of a debate about 
‘proximity’ between scientific consultants and aid donors on the one hand, and their 
clients in poor countries on the other.  In short, the article is about the desirability of 
bringing responsibility into line with supposed generosity. 
 
 
key words  environmental health, arsenic poisoning, water, Bangladesh, legal 
geography, proximity, toxic torts  
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Toxic torts:  arsenic poisoning in Bangladesh and the legal geographies of 
responsibility 
 
Introduction  
In 2002, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
recognized access to water as an independent human right: ‘the right to water clearly falls 
within the category of guarantees essential for securing an adequate standard of living, 
particularly since it is one of the most fundamental conditions for survival’ (WHO 2003).  
Among the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Bangladesh has taken this right most 
seriously.  Approximately 97 per cent of its rural people now have access to 
bacteriologically clean water (MLG 2003), as a result of the installation of about 12 
million tubewells.1  These supply about 80 per cent of national drinking water demand 
(Ahmed 2002).2  We can attribute at least part of the significant drop in infant mortality, 
from 151 to 83 per thousand 1960-96, and in under-five mortality from 247 to 112 per 
thousand, to this ready availability of clean water (WHO 2000).3  Until the middle of the 
1990s this was the only element of national water policy that had widespread support and 
that did not present major technical difficulties (Black 1990).  The other strands, 
including the Flood Action Plan, sanitation, water pollution, irrigation, drainage, cyclone 
shelters, and fisheries, were all more or less problematic and their policies widely 
criticized (Wood 1999).4  
 
The expansion of tubewells came with the financial help of UNICEF after the 
independence of Bangladesh in 1971.  At first sight, they seem to be the perfect 
development tool – a cheap and effective technology that has been received 
enthusiastically by the users.  Having a tubewell was a matter of convenience but also a 
status symbol and, as a result, people have been willing to invest their own money in 
private installations (Black 1990).  There are limitless supplies of the raw material 
underground, a Promethean bounty waiting to be released.  However, the result of this 
reliance upon tubewells – a cruel irony this – has been an environmental health disaster 
of unprecedented proportions, many times worse than Chernobyl and Bhopal combined 
(Smith et al. 2000).  About a third of tubewells produce seriously contaminated water, 
with a broad swathe across the centre and south of the country being particularly at risk 
(Atkins et al. 2006a).5 One estimate is that millions of people will die or suffer from the 
very serious consequences of consuming the arsenic that occurs naturally in aquifers in 
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the Holocene sediments of the Bengal delta (Yu et al. 2003).6 Arsenic is a colourless, 
odourless and tasteless poison and, to give an idea of its miniscule presence, it occurs at 
the equivalent of about one-third of a teaspoon-full dissolved in the water of an 
Olympic-sized swimming pool (Meharg 2004).   
 
One exemplary case of is that of Binod Sutradhar, a carpenter from Ramrail in 
Brahmanbaria district.  He suffers from painful keratoses, hard lumps or papules, on his 
hands and feet, which he claims are the result of consuming water contaminated with 
minute traces of arsenic.7  In 2001, along with a large group of his fellow sufferers, he 
decided to take on the might of the western science-based aid complex, in the surrogate 
form of the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC).  They are the parent body 
of the British Geological Survey (BGS), who in the early 1990s undertook a survey of 
groundwater quality in his region (Davies and Exley 1992), on behalf of the Overseas 
Development Administration (ODA).  This failed to check for arsenic and, because of 
this oversight, Mr Sutradhar accuses the NERC of negligence. Other possible defendants 
might have been the Government of Bangladesh (GoB), or the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), both of which have encouraged the sinking of tubewells, 
but the NERC was chosen instead in the ironic context of postcolonial environmental 
justice, with the litigation taking place under the jurisdiction of the courts of the former 
imperial power. The case has so far progressed from a hearing in the High Court in 
London to the Court of Appeal and in 2006 it will go to the House of Lords.8  The legal 
argument to date has only been about whether a trial should take place and no detailed 
evidence has yet been heard. 
 
Mr Sutradhar is alleging a ‘tort’, legally defined as a damage caused by someone else’s 
action or inaction. The point of law at stake is the controversial notion of ‘proximity’: the 
nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in terms of geography and 
‘duty of care’.  The NERC/BGS is alleged to be liable because of its responsibility, 
through its water monitoring activities, to the water consumers who would have 
benefited from a fuller analysis of the samples they collected. This is a developing area of 
environmental law that has major implications for scientific consultancy and the 
application of expert knowledge in the aid industry, and it raises the issue of whether 
western academics and researchers have a legal responsibility to their clients in the LDCs.  
If we were writing lurid tabloid headlines, we might call it the ‘Revenge of the Third 
 4
World’: the frankly extraordinary prospect of ordinary people, who have suffered the 
negative environmental consequences of failed development projects, claiming damages 
in courts around the world.  
 
A more measured legal appraisal is that proximity, in its present definition at least, will be 
difficult to prove in the case of the mass arsenic poisoning in Bangladesh and that the 
NERC is very unlikely to be found liable for any failure in their duty of care (Pugh and 
Criddle 2004).  But the importance of Sutradhar v NERC may be more symbolic than 
having a specific outcome for the Bangladeshi litigants.  If the case ever comes to trial it 
could act as a trojan horse in terms of the legal arguments that may be used in future, 
stronger cases of negligence in environmental policy or practice.  The potential 
significance, in terms of the emergence of a new breed of transboundary environmental 
actions with a global face, has been revealed recently in the journal Nature, where it has 
been speculated by Allen and Lord (2004) that evidence linking global warming to the 
release of greenhouse gases is now so strong that at some point it may be possible to 
mount a legal argument apportioning blame for deleterious consequences.  The example 
they give is the enhanced death rates in parts of western Europe due to increases in 
temperatures of up to 10° C higher than normal in the summer of 2003.   
 
The present paper addresses the principal irony that well-intentioned actions to provide 
sustainable solutions to environmental problems occasionally go wrong with disastrous 
consequences.  In this case the actions were international, and Sutradhar v NERC seeks, 
in the globalized context of the aid industry, to bring responsibility in line with supposed 
generosity.9  We start with a consideration of the tortious spaces of the arsenic crisis in 
Bangladesh.  This is followed by a consideration of fault and liability through a 
discussion of the case that has been brought in the British courts.  Finally, we conclude 
with a discussion of the concept of proximity. 
 
What space for environmental justice? 
Nick Blomley and David Delaney have pioneered legal geographies and enhanced our 
understanding of how courts construct and interpret place and space (Blomley 1994, 
Delaney et al. 2001).  But, as Delaney (2001, 487-88) remarks, nature and the 
environment have been ‘virtually neglected’ in this literature.  We foresee in the present 
paper the emergence of new legal geographies of socio-natures.  These are the means by 
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which nature is penetrated and regulated through the structures of the law.  We reject, 
for instance, dualisms of culture and nature and regard the generation of poisoned water 
from a latent source as neither a wholly technological, nor as a solely geological 
phenomenon.  It is a novel hazard that has few parallels.  No profit was involved and no 
manufacture, and there was no accidental release of bye-products, so comparison with 
standard chemical pollution incidents is fruitless.  The sole victims are humans, so there 
can be no charge of ecocide.  The international dimension involves no dispute about 
contested raw materials or waste products.  Rather, this is an environmental health crisis 
that could be viewed as a tragic accident that was not foreseeable, or as an act of 
scientific incompetence and gross negligence that requires redress through the 
mechanisms of compensation and deterrence.   
 
Various lines of redress for damage are available in the international law protecting 
public environmental health.  The first is application of the criminal law, where a state 
body may prosecute polluters for infringements of official regulations (Koenig and 
Rustad 2004).  This is most appropriate for companies producing hazardous waste and is 
not relevant for our discussion.  Second, there is the arena of public international law, in 
which obligations are adduced for both state and non-state actors.  The International 
Law Commission of the United Nations is seeking to clarify and codify these, for 
instance with respect to transboundary environmental damage, and impacts upon the 
global commons.  Among geographers, Mason (1999, 2001, and 2005) has probably 
contributed most in this area to understandings of the spatialities of transnational 
environmental harm.  He adopts a stance of critical pragmatism and shows how a 
combination of treaty obligations, the ‘soft law’ of declarations and resolutions (Paradell-
Trius 2000), and court rulings, has contributed to a redistribution of authority away from 
the nation state.  International bodies, corporations, NGOs and other non-state actors 
are now increasingly empowered to make spaces of environmental justice.  Mason (2001) 
interrogates Habermas’s principle of communicative discourse and finds a non-territorial 
version of democratic accountability.  This is underpinned in the literature of 
environmental pragmatism by parallel moral spaces of transnational obligation, although 
as yet the response of the international community has been slow, no doubt because 
proven and legally-enforceable obligations can be expensive. 
 
 6
Third, private international environmental law is a field that has grown in parallel with 
the global green agenda in the last twenty years, but cross-boundary toxic tort cases 
between private parties have so far had limited exposure.  The International Court of 
Justice has taken on environmental cases since 1993 but only at the state-to-state level 
(Alkoby, 2003; Fitzmaurice, 2004).  The potentially promising idea of an International 
Environmental Court for non-state disputes has not progressed beyond the stage of 
speculation (Rest 1998), and the bilateral and multilateral agreements within which cross-
boundary environmental torts can be litigated remain inadequate for private cases and 
institutionally thin (Rao 2004).10  Plaintiffs thus have to fall back on testing their 
entitlement to environmental justice by suing for compensation in their own courts 
under domestic common law or in foreign jurisdictions, as with Sutradhar v NERC.   
 
The present paper investigates private tort litigation.11  In tort lawsuits, injured parties 
may sue to recover their position before the tort, through various forms of corrective 
justice such as monetary compensation or remediation. In the United States, the father of 
tort theory in the late nineteenth was Oliver Wendell Holmes, and he distinguished three 
types of legal redress (Rosenberg 1995).  First was the application of the principle of 
‘strict liability’, where the perpetrator of unintentional damage may be held to account, 
for instance, for the use of an inherently dangerous or unpredictable technology, even 
without the need to prove fault.12  Second, negligence may be judged tortious, as may the 
third, and obvious category, of intentional wrongs.  In Britain, the law of torts, a branch 
of the common law, has been gradually accumulating over the centuries, and it is still ‘an 
object in motion’ (Xue 2003, 270), with scope for further development.  For instance, 
there has been a rapid acceleration of compensation claims in recent years, following the 
example of personal injury litigation in the U.S.A...  As the name suggests, a ‘toxic tort’ is 
caused by a noxious substance that damages health (Pugh and Day 1995), a recent 
example, for instance, being mesothelioma, which is caused by exposure to asbestos 
(White 2004).   
 
As yet, geographers have tended to approach torts from the points of view of 
environmental sustainability or the liability regimes of transnational corporations in 
global economic governance.  Mason (2001, 421) reminds us that corporate capitals are 
well positioned in their operating strategies ‘to displace liability claims on to less stringent 
judicial systems (notably in the global South) where the damage occurred’ and away from 
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the courts in Europe and North America, where scrutiny is more rigorous.  The present 
paper addresses just such an attempt to shift the locus of liability via arguments about the 
relationship between the parties in a court case; but the case is being heard in the British 
courts and this is an important landmark in opening out the question of jurisdiction of 
transboundary environmental issues.  Our emphasis upon civil liability highlights an 
approach that, according to Mason (2001, 422), is gradually ‘accumulating legal authority’. 
 
The globalization of notions of justice is a relatively recent phenomenon.  Silbey (2001) 
comments that televised images of the American legal process, usually criminal court 
cases, have helped to spread such ideas, in the sense that they are products ‘sold’ in a 
postmodern, postcolonial setting of entertainment in which the signs are consumed, 
signifying hypothetical rights of redress.  But for her this does not indicate any immediate 
likelihood of progress and in fact she suggests that currently the phrase ‘global justice’ is 
an oxymoron.  Although expectations have been created through the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), there are many countries where the practical socio-
legal empowerment of poor people for such basic needs as clean water remains distant.   
 
The social movement literature on LDCs indicates that, although civil society remains 
weak in many of these countries, there are increasing numbers of NGOs pursuing legal 
channels for the resolution of environmental issues, thus producing democratic spaces 
that in the global North would more often be associated with formal state institutions 
(Stiles 2002).  Morgan (2005), for instance, has found widespread evidence of social 
protest on water issues.  In Bangladesh there is a rich variety of such movements with a 
legal or environmental emphasis, and their reach is gradually taking on an international 
dimension through links with overseas partners.  In the present case study we will 
encounter Brotee, an indigenous NGO working on water since 1997, and the Bangladesh 
Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA).13  Both are active in a range of 
environmental issues and for the arsenic case they have been assisted by the London-
based Bangladesh International Action Network and by Leigh Day & Co, one of a new 
breed of environmental law companies that are actively involved in LDCs.  There is also 
in Dhaka the NGOs’ Arsenic and Information Support Unit, a joint venture between 
WaterAid Bangladesh and the NGO Forum for Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation, 
and many other organizations working on practical help for the victims of arsenic 
poisoning.   
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 The spacings of torts are complex.  Although the damage is time-space specific, the 
causal chain may be lengthy, in the case of Sutradhar v NERC allegedly stretching from 
Bangladesh to the BGS headquarters in Nottinghamshire, with intermediation from the 
GoB, the British Government’s ODA, and the NERC.  This particular strand is only one 
in a web of funding bodies, consultants and engineers who were involved with the vast 
tubewell programme in Bangladesh.  ‘Proximity’ in this case is best interpreted as 
interconnexions in a global network of information and influence, supporting Gregory’s 
(2004, 249) claim that ‘distance is never an absolute, fixed and frozen, and within the 
colonial present, like the colonial past, the power to transform distance…is typically 
arrogated by metropolitan cultures’.   
 
What then of the intersecting skeins of responsibility that constitute the globalised 
system of aid and consultancy?  They are so complex that Beck (1999, 55) has called the 
difficulty of attributing blame a ‘travesty of the hazard technocracy’ because ‘if it is 
necessary to name one and only one actor, in the overwhelming majority of cases no 
actor can be named’.  But each transaction, whether economic or scientific, is potentially 
damaging and therefore carries with it a latent liability, and the law of torts may therefore 
provide an answer for Beck’s problem.  If it ever breaks through into the mainstream of 
quotidian international relations, it will fundamentally change the relationship between 
patrons and clients from one of caveat emptor (consumer beware) to caveat venditor (provider 
beware).  Few outside the realms of socio-legal scholarship have thought of the world as 
legally inscribed in this way but, in one sense, we are identifying a future action-oriented 
justice that might put a measure of power into the hands of the wronged.  Torts also, 
because compensation is involved, allocate a price to damage and therefore create a 
market that values environmental harm.  Some argue that torts are preferable to the 
regulatory regime of international institutions in that they address harm in place-based 
contexts because they function at the human scale of the individual and the community 
(Anderson 2002).   
 
The body-environment nexus 
Kroll-Smith and Westervelt (2004) cite American cases that illustrate the ready 
permeability of the boundary between bodies and nature.  They discuss mainly pollution 
by dangerous manufactured chemicals, but we might add chemicals used in food 
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manufacture, chemicals such as fluoride that have been deliberately introduced to the 
human environment with a view to some beneficial effect, and natural toxins that 
adversely affect human health (Thornton 2000).  Arsenic is an example of the last 
category.  It is one of the commonest elements, being widely dispersed in low 
concentrations in the environment, and traces are therefore present in our normal diet.  
It only becomes dangerous in food and water above critical concentrations, which for 
water was recently reconfirmed by the World Health Organization as ten parts per billion 
(WHO 2004). A shocking aspect of the arsenic crisis in Bangladesh is that it affects 
somewhere between 28 and 57 million people, many of whom it is thought will develop 
internal cancers as a result of years of consuming contaminated tubewell water (BGS and 
DPHE 2001).14  This is ‘the largest mass poisoning of a population in history’ (Smith et 
al. 2000, 1093).   
 
A problem with such superlatives of disaster is the degree to which expert advice about 
body-environment links is admissible in court (Browne et al. 1998).  The notorious 
United States Supreme Court judgement of Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc (1993) 
added in this respect a filter that has significantly influenced the law of torts in that 
country, with implications further afield (Edmond and Mercer 2004).  The justices 
required that judges in future must screen the quality of experts called by both sides, with 
a view to admitting only reliable testimony.  This sounds reasonable, especially when one 
considers that many of the so-called ‘experts’ called to the witness stand have in the past 
often been poorly qualified to give an opinion (Huber 1991), but the outcome in practice 
has been to disadvantage plaintiffs.  Where the science is indeterminate, controversial, 
unsettled, or causal links are difficult to establish, it is not easy to persuade judges to take 
a case seriously, for instance in complex diseases that have a long period of latency.  
Arsenicosis is one such disease, and we might add that the problems of plaintiffs are 
multiplied if they are poor, non-literate and perhaps from a country lacking a depth of 
experience in environmental law (Kanner 2004).  All of these disadvantages apply to the 
Bangladeshi arsenic sufferers, who are nearly all poor rural people.  Due to inadequate 
nutrition, and a high consumption of water in the tropical heat, their bodies are more 
open than most to the insidious poisoning of arsenic (Smith et al. 2000), yet their access 
to environmental justice is limited, both in Bangladesh and in foreign courts where 
Daubert-like attitudes prevail. 
 
 10
Environmental legal strategies 
Strategic thinking has become an important part of environmental citizenship in the 
global North.  New social movements and environmental lobby groups have achieved 
much in the last twenty years by protests that have been focussed, targeted and 
coordinated.  Toffolon-Weiss and Roberts (2004) discuss legal strategising with regard to 
environmental litigation.  Suing for damage from a toxic tort is not, in their experience, 
sufficient.  The evidence of cases in Louisiana indicates that four ingredients are required 
for success.  First, framing a message is important, with respect to the particular 
grievance and the goals for action.  Second, alignment with other interest groups is 
usually of mutual benefit, especially where the partner is a national or international 
organization, such as Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth, with experience and resources.  
Third, a legal strategy is essential, in order to decide whom to sue and in which court.  
Both of these have been difficult to decide in the case of arsenic.  Should the GoB be 
held responsible, or its western expert advisers, or the funders of the tubewell 
technology?  Should the case be brought in Bangladesh or overseas in a court with 
greater perceived sympathy for environmental justice and the power to impose punitive 
damages?  Fourth, a protest strategy is indispensable.  Toffolon-Weiss and Roberts found 
that high profile media campaigns and disruptive civil disobedience are particularly 
effective in getting the attention of the courts and increasing the likelihood of a 
satisfactory outcome.  Such performative citizenship is part of what may be termed a 
marketing campaign for environmental issues. The ability to plan, coordinate and execute 
such strategies will depend to a certain extent upon the cohesiveness of what 
Freudenberg (1997) and Picou et al. (2004) have called ‘corrosive communities’.  These 
are groups of people who have been thrown together, usually by the chronic impact of 
similar torts, and whose identity and dynamic is shaped by factors such as their collective 
physical and mental health, their anger at the system failure of institutions, and the length 
of the litigation in which they are involved.   
 
Although the Bangladeshi arsenic case shows some signs of strategic planning, one 
suspects that this has been mainly top-down.  Well-intentioned environmental lawyers 
have played an important role, along with local and international NGOs.  There has been 
media coverage but, with honourable exceptions, it has more been in the mode of 
disaster reporting than explorations of the underlying issues.  Collective protests and 
performative action by the members of corrosive communities has been minimal other 
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than in the commencement of legal action in the British courts.  As we will see, even this 
seems to be on shaky ground, not yet having come to trial.   
 
Toxic torts:  Sutradhar v NERC 
Denunciation of a guilty party has not been straightforward in the case of arsenic in 
Bangladesh.  There were many stakeholders involved in the provision of clean water, 
from technical experts and funders to policy-makers and well engineers.  Who among 
them is to blame?  When it became clear in the 1990s that there was a major 
environmental health crisis emerging, it was UNICEF that the Ministry of Environment 
and the Department of Public Health Engineering first thought of suing (Anon 1999).  
This was because UNICEF has provided funds for the sinking of up to one million 
tubewells since 1972 (Mahmud and Capella 1999; Smith et al. 2000).  D’Monte (2004) has 
reported that a senior health official of the GoB claimed at a meeting of Asian 
environmental journalists in Comilla that Bangladesh was ‘a victim of UNICEF 
aggression’ and that the arsenic poisoning was a case of ‘criminal negligence’.  There is 
no hint, however, in UNICEF publications devoted to their contribution to water 
development in the region, of any sense of guilt or culpability (UNICEF 2000).  
According to Pearce (2001), UNICEF’s usual defence is that ‘at the time, standard 
procedures for testing the safety of groundwater did not include tests for arsenic [which] 
had never before been found in the kind of geological formations that exist in 
Bangladesh.’ In any case, 90 per cent of tubewells are privately owned, so UNICEF and 
other funders only started and encouraged what became largely a popular movement of 
self-provisioning (BAMWSP 2004), and, ultimately, UNICEF has global legal immunity 
as part of the United Nations family of institutions.15 
 
A possible model for litigation is the Bhopal disaster.  This was a chemical leak in 1984 
from a Union Carbide factory in India that was responsible for the deaths of thousands, 
immediately and in the twenty year aftermath.  The Indian government assumed 
responsibility for suing the transnational corporation, and this was done initially in the 
American courts (Xue 2003).  However, the GoB has not shown any resolve for 
mounting a similar action and all of the legal proceedings have so far been privately 
initiated (Murshid 2004).  First, in 1999 the prominent Advocate, Rabia Bhuiyan, applied 
to the Bangladesh High Court for a writ to force the GoB to show cause why they 
should not halt the installation of further tubewells when they knew about arsenic-
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contaminated groundwater.16 Soon after, Brotee, a campaigning NGO in Dhaka, made a 
similar writ application and in July 2001 the government was instructed to respond;17 
then in August 2005 the Supreme Court in Dhaka directed the GoB to implement its 
own National Arsenic Mitigation Policy and Plan and to honour its legal duty to provide 
safe water (Anon 2005).18   
 
These positive developments in Dhaka are part of a dual strategy adopted by 
Bangladesh’s environmental justice organizations.  In addition to legal action in 
Bangladesh, they spotted a potential opening in the international dimension of aid and 
consultancy that is so intimately entwined with every aspect of development in that 
country.  In May and July 2001 a team of solicitors from the British firm of Leigh Day & 
Co met fifteen arsenic victims in two villages of Chandpur district (Mortoza 2003).  Its 
partners in Bangladesh are Brotee, BELA, the Dhaka Community Hospital, and the 
Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (Anon 2001; Anon 2002).  Brotee were aiming 
for compensatory payments of at least £5,000 per head for the victims they had 
identified (Anon 2003).  Legal action was started in London in August 2002 (Leigh Day 
& Co 2004) on behalf of 512 clients alleging negligence by the BGS in the execution of 
their 1992 survey.  The BGS report purported to comment on the quality of groundwater 
but, despite testing for 31 trace elements, did not look for a contaminant, arsenic, that 
had been found in other parts of the country and was listed by the WHO ‘Guidelines for 
drinking water quality’ as a hazard in drinking water.  A sample case was issued in the 
name of Binod Sutradhar, asserting that he had suffered personal injury as a result of 
drinking the water, and in February 2003 a further case was lodged for Mrs Lucky 
Begum.19   
 
In May 2003 the High Court in London gave permission for this case to go to trial 
(Bachtold 2003).  The Bangladeshis were hoping that eventually it would be possible to 
bring a class action involving hundreds or thousands of those who have the symptoms of 
arsenicosis.  Much depended on whether the BGS (through the NERC) owed these 
water consumers ‘a duty of care’.20  The British courts have hitherto dealt with such cases 
of environmental justice mainly in terms of nuisance and negligence (Pugh and Criddle 
2004).  Counsel on behalf of the claimant here argued a failure of a duty of care.  Davies 
and Exley were accused of not mentioning arsenic, not because that particular element 
was itemised in the brief, it was not, but because the study aimed to understand ‘the 
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modes of occurrence of trace elements that may be toxic to biological systems’. 21  
According to Mr Sutradhar, ‘in 1992 the possibility of arsenic being present in the 
groundwater should have been known to reasonably competent hydrogeologists’.22  If 
the report was not intended as an analysis of the potability of water, then that should 
have been made clear. Sharmeen Murshid (n.d. 1) goes further  
 ‘The arsenic crisis in Bangladesh is a classical example of negligence and 
distorted development policies.  Both governments and international agencies 
must share the blame and must be made accountable for [their] actions’. 
 
In response, the NERC defended the BGS by stating that, as far as they were concerned, 
they owed no duty of care to Mr Sutradhar and Mrs Begum, nor, by implication, to any 
of the other consumers of water in Bangladesh (BGS 2001, NERC 2005).  The 1992 
report was prepared for the ODA and there were no contractual arrangements with any 
organization in Bangladesh.  The work was part of an agricultural irrigation project and, 
as such, had nothing to do with drinking water.  The BGS had no relationship with the 
claimants, who were anyway unaware that the report existed and therefore could not 
have made any decisions about their water supply based upon it.  The NERC also 
reminded the court that they were ‘not responsible for the presence of arsenic in the 
water and had no responsibility for removing the arsenic’ and, anyway, they had at no 
time certified the water as fit for human consumption.  In their opinion ‘no reasonably 
experienced researcher would have tested for the presence of arsenic in this location 
without some special reason to do so’ (NERC 2003).23 
 
During the High Court hearing the claimant argued that the NERC had withheld 
material documentation.  Mr Justice Simon decided that this was true and that a fuller 
analysis of the case at trial was therefore justified.   
 
In February 2004 the Court of Appeal disagreed with the lower court and struck out the 
claim, chiefly on the grounds of a lack of proximity between the parties.24  Legally, 
proximity may involve closeness in space and time but mainly addresses other aspects of 
the relationship between parties, for instance the close association between a parent and 
a child, a solicitor and a client, or a food manufacturer and a consumer (NERC 2005).  
Because proximity, or ‘neighbourhood’ as it is sometimes called, is contingent upon the 
facts of each case, the courts have tended to rely incrementally upon the precedent of 
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case law rather than any precise definition or foundational principle.  Having said that, 
‘foreseeability’ of the damage is generally thought of as a necessary condition, in this case 
referring to the reasonable likelihood that the 1992 BGS report would be shown to the 
Bangladeshi authorities responsible for ensuring a safe water supply in the study region 
as a basis for action.   
 
In the Court of Appeal, the three judges delivered technical judgements that had little 
factual or abstract moral content.  Lord Justice Kennedy’s commentary was divided into 
what he called ‘the construction issue’ and ‘the proximity issue’. On the former, he 
remarked that the report was clearly not intended as a comprehensive and definitive 
statement of water standards and, on the latter, he concluded that the BGS had ‘no duty 
to provide the claimant or his fellow citizens with potable water.  They had no power to 
do so, and they could not even warn him of any dangers’.  Lord Justice Wall agreed and 
said that these points were sufficient to strike out the appeal, but Lord Justice Clarke 
demurred in his minority judgement.  He attached particular weight to the statement of 
Dr Sara Bennett, a Canadian environmental specialist consulting on Bangladesh’s 
Northeast Regional Water Management Plan, who pointed out that the GoB relies 
heavily upon foreign organizations for data gathering and analysis, with the implication 
that the 1992 report was therefore in close associative proximity to their decision-making 
processes.  Lord Justice Clarke did not give any indication that he favoured Sutradhar’s 
case but he perceived in its element of proximity sufficient novelty to recommend a trial 
in this developing area of jurisprudence.  For him the case of the NERC was weak in as 
much as: 
‘the citizens of Bangladesh like the claimants were (at least potentially) so closely 
and directly affected by the negligent act or omission of the defendant in failing 
to test for arsenic and/or, having done so, in failing to make it clear to the reader 
of the 1992 report that there might be trace elements (including arsenic) not 
tested for which might pose a hazard to human health, that it ought reasonably to 
have had them in contemplation when deciding what to test for and how to 
report the results’. 
 
Lord Justice Wall said that at first he had agreed with Lord Justice Clarke but then had 
changed his mind on hearing the arguments of counsel.  The basis for this was that the 
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precedent cases were in his opinion not sufficiently favourable for a definition of 
proximity broad enough for Mr Sutradhar’s case. 
 
As a result of this judgement, the legal position for the time being seems to be that 
consultants are not legally liable in development aid situations ‘because of the geography, 
chain of dealings, and supposedly the need to protect the future provision of 
development aid funds which may become restricted if legal claims arise in respect of 
services provided’ (Michalowska 2004).  Beck (1999) predicted exactly this kind of 
outcome due to the ‘risk society’s’ ‘organized irresponsibility’, where attribution of 
responsibility has become increasingly difficult in complex technological systems. 
 
It might be thought that the legal action was therefore pointless and achieved nothing.  It 
is true that the complainants have so far gone empty-handed but they and those 
sympathetic to their action will have noted the minority judgement by Lord Justice 
Clarke and the opening out of the issues has certainly been of significance for a number 
of reasons.  First, the very notions of a duty of care and of proximity are now higher on 
the agenda of environmental law than they were before and, in the very process of 
holding the NERC to account, Mr Sutradhar and Mrs Begum have been producing 
natures radically different from our previous understandings (Delaney 2001).  These were 
subtly differentiated in the advocacy of the top silks Hon. Michael Beloff QC and Lord 
(Dan) Brennan QC, and also in the majority and minority judgements, and whether one 
favours the claimants or not, it seems likely that the arguments deployed on their behalf 
will appear again in future cases, with outcomes that will vary with different 
constructions of the balance between rights and responsibilities, with the varying 
institutional settings and, of course, with the diverse socio-natures on trial.   
 
Second, however, whether one likes it or not, the epistemological singularities of the law 
have been imprinted upon environmental issues.  Thus, Valverde (2003) and other 
sociologists of the legal process have revealed how court room knowledge is a curious 
hybrid of witness statements and facts gleaned from expert testimony, comprising that 
quasi-transcendental entity, ‘common knowledge’. In the case of torts, the bar for 
scientific evidence tends to be set high because such an elevated value is placed upon the 
expert views. This tends to favour the global corporation or the scientific institution, 
with their teams of professionally plausible experts, against the ordinary consumer 
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citizen, so we hold out no immediate hope that Sutradhar v NERC can make a difference 
unless the House of Lords is willing to allow it to come to trial.  In January 2005 their 
Appellate Committee granted permission for a hearing, likely to take place in mid-2006 
but, even if they overrule the Court of Appeal, a trial in the High Court would be two 
years away.25  Because the House of Lords provides a function of clarifying the general 
principles of law, they may well decide that a trial would serve the public interest.26  They 
are not bound by precedent in quite the same way as lower courts and are therefore more 
open to new and innovatory ideas. 
 
Ethics and proximity 
The ethics of proximity are far from straightforward.  According to Lord Atkin, in a 
classic judgement,  
‘The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must 
not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, “who is my 
neighbour?” receives a restricted reply.’  
He argued that a duty care means that: 
‘You must take reasonable care to avoid acts and omissions which you 
can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, 
then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be – persons who 
are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably 
have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing 
my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.’27 
The definition of a neighbour and of his/her proximity is therefore crucial. Smith (1998, 
18) sets out the Aristotelian origins of the notion that ‘extreme distance leads to 
indifference, while extreme closeness can lead to pity, or to such other emotions as envy 
and destructive rivalry: part of the everyday experience of face-to-face society’.   
Boltanski (1993, 16) discusses this in the light of the global reach of the media and 
problematizes spectatorship in order to understand the link between the politics of pity 
and the politics of action.  He makes a similar point: 
‘The person who sees from afar is unaware of other people receiving the news, 
how near they are relative to the case, their readiness to act and whether or not 
they have pre-commitments.  Each is thereby uncertain as to the existence of a 
ranked series of persons under an obligation to act to different degrees, as to 
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their possible position in this series, and as to the failure to act of possible helpers 
higher up in the series for whom they would have to become substitutes’.28 
 
On the other hand, Singer (1979, 2004), Corbridge (1993), Rawls (1999), Smith (2000), 
Follesdal and Pogge (2005), and Pogge (2006) and many others restate the principles of 
universal, non-localized obligations and human rights. Without such obligations, 
international relations, at both state and non-state levels, would diverge irreconcilably 
from egalitarian ideas of justice.  They would also ignore the essential geographical 
observation that people’s misfortunes often relate to their location, which in turn is a 
function of the contingencies of historical geography (Smith 1998).  
 
Rorty (1989) would have us believe that meaning is derived from hope.  Because of our 
commitment, like him, to certain aspects of pragmatism, we agree but wish to add an 
emphasis on action and practice (Atkins et al. 2006b).  This may be the place-specific, 
integrative conduct stressed by Cutchin (1999, 268) as promoting ‘the situational, 
deliberative, active, moral components of health and health care’, but it may also be 
action at a scale that crosses continents.  Denying responsibility because of an absence of 
immediacy of spatial association becomes morally indefensible if we reject the simplistic 
idea of proximity as co-presence and see it instead in its full complexity as networked 
association.  At present the aid industry is using state institutions as holding companies 
or clearing houses of responsibility, in a way that enables a deniability of proximity.  If 
there are sufficient steps in between the end user and the service provider, it is unlikely at 
present that anyone can be held to account.  What is required, therefore, is the further 
development and maturing of the concept of proximity.  Judicial commentaries on 
Sutradhar v NERC retain traces of a pre-modern law of torts, where the idea of action at a 
distance had yet to be assimilated, let alone any concept of global action.  In order to 
guard against Habermas’s concerns about the possibility of judicial tyranny, that judges 
tend to act according to their own interests and of the system that they serve (Ingram 
2002), we need what Rorty (1980) calls a ‘cosmopolitan conversation of humankind’ in 
order to establish the pragmatic parameters that will redefine proximity in the interests of 
global environmental justice.   
 
Missing from the judgements of both the High Court and the Court of Appeal is any 
appreciation of the reality of ‘action at a distance’ in the worlds of environmental 
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consultancy and international aid, or, for that matter, of the global reach of transnational 
capitalism.  Sutradhar v NERC is an opportunity to debate this issue, and a more nuanced 
notion of proximity that would, in our opinion, be bound to eventuate.  From a 
geographical point of view, Mason (2001, 422) has argued that ‘the growth of 
international law attests to the unbundling of sovereign authority for environmental 
governance, allowing new interstices of accountability’, and it could be argued that 
responsibility for the arsenic poisoning of millions of people in Bangladesh can be 
understood only in terms of theoretical contexts that are very different from the spaces 
of scientific and legal realism. 
 
Torts, proximity and legal geographies 
There have been various suggestions recently to provide a different vision of torts, toxic 
and otherwise.  Berger (1997), for instance, argues that reliance upon expert scientific 
evidence to establish causal proof of harm has been an encumbrance to justice.  Thus 
epidemiological evidence is treated with scepticism by judge and jury, and often with 
good reason because proof of causation is exceptionally difficult when cancers, for 
instance, can have several origins.  In the case of arsenic there is no single signature 
symptom that is derived solely from that source, so establishing a link is difficult with a 
level of probability that would satisfy a statistician.  In addition, she argues for a 
fundamental overhaul of torts because of ‘the present system’s indifference to creating 
adequate inducements, short of litigation, to goad [polluters] into gathering the data and 
funding the research that [is] essential to identifying and assessing potential risks’ (Berger 
1997, 2131).  She proposes that knowledge is so uncertain that the law should shift from 
proof of causality, always a problem for poor litigants and therefore a key issue in the 
‘environmental justice’, towards a duty of care.  This would require the corporation, 
government or institution to undertake research and provide information relating to risk.  
If due care is exercised in this way, then there would be no liability for injuries caused by 
pollution or dangerous products; the consumer or bystander would have been warned 
and would therefore have to bear the consequences. But if research was inadequate or 
not disseminated, the polluter would have to pay compensation.  There are several issues 
here.  First, in non-literate societies with weak systems of communication, how could the 
public be informed?  Second, in information-rich societies might there not be an 
overload of risk data for individual citizens?  Third, informational spaces and hazardous 
spaces have become complex in the era of global risks.  
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 Even more fundamental is Desmond Manderson’s (2006) reinterpretation of torts 
along the lines of proximity in the thought of Emmanuel Lévinas.  In this formulation, 
proximity is seen as fundamental to ethics and also to the common law, and, in as 
much as legal geographies are elaborations of the nuances of proximity, they are 
therefore a key to both.  Lévinas wrote of proximity, not in the calculative terms of 
Lord Atkin, but as an ‘event that takes place prior to our having any categories in 
which to confine it’ (Manderson 2006, 178).  It is constitutive of subjectivity, in its 
passive mode at least, which is always built in relation to the ‘other’ (Campbell 1999).  
It is not the result of choice or reason but comes as a surprise to both plaintiff and 
defendant.  Manderson therefore rejects the fiction of forseeability, and the implicitly 
required foreknowledge of those affected by a tort, in favour of the element of 
negligence called ‘breach’, a failure of the non-contractual duty of care potentially owed 
to the rest of the world.  Here he is reflecting the Lévinasian definition of proximity as 
arising ‘not from my choices or foresight, nor from our policies, but from your 
vulnerability’ (Manderson 2006, 176).  Through this insight, Mr Sutradhar is in 
proximity to the NERC through his asymmetric relationship with them and a capacity to 
be harmed that he could not avoid.   
 
Manderson goes on to argue that we must focus on the relationship between the 
parties and ‘the power and the passivity of their dynamic’.  He suggests that the 
question of proximity ‘will only be resolved by a greater concentration on the actual 
and lived connection between the two, and not by a greater abstraction’ (2006, 172).  
Legal geographies present an opportunity here at scales ranging from the local to the 
global. One possible approach is via gift theory, especially in the poststructural 
versions that involve high levels of mutuality between parties (Silk 2004, Barnett 
2005).  Another might be, as hinted above, a theory of networked, associative 
proximity. 
 
Conclusion 
If the House of Lords sends this case to trial, it may yet turn out to be a landmark.  The 
NERC was sued in the negligence element of the law relevant to environmental torts.29  
While some academics and members of the public may have sympathy with Davies and 
Exley for being put in the firing line, when they no doubt thought that their 1992 report 
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was just another scientific report that would have a narrow audience and one that would 
make a small but positive contribution to the development of Bangladesh, there are 
others who argue that the full weight of responsibility should be borne by those of us 
who write such reports or undertake consultancy work in the developing world.  
Certainly, the concept of proximity has, in our view, scope for revision in the light of the 
ethical writings of Lévinas and poststructural gift theory, and, as a result, legal 
geographies may in future be propelled into the limelight of debates about torts of 
global significance. 
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Endnotes 
1   The most common type of tubewell is in essence a small diameter metal or PVC pipe 
sunk vertically into soft, unconsolidated alluvial sediments.  The water is pumped up 
from the aquifer by means of a handle. 
(http://banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/T_0240.htm). Accessed 2 February 2006. 
2   Pond and river water was previously used throughout rural Bangladesh, with access 
restrictions due to distance and ownership that meant inconvenience and hardship, 
particularly for the ultra poor. 
3   Apart from clean water, the introduction of oral rehydration therapy was also 
important. 
4   It is worth noting that exploitation of groundwater suited successive governments in 
the face of water shortages that were predicted to follow India’s inauguration of the 
Farakka Barrage on the River Ganges in 1975. 
5   The arsenic can be removed but there is no consensus yet on an appropriate 
technology to do so at the level of the household.  Although tubewells are entirely 
responsible for the arsenic pollution, they may still be the best solution because drilling 
to greater depths generally yields safe water.  The piping of water, either to standpipes or 
directly to households, is another attractive technology, and here the water might be 
chemically treated or from deep tubewells. 
6   One theory is that anaerobic conditions underground favour the mobilisation of 
arsenic, assisted by microbiological reactions in sediments with an organic component.  
An alternative is that falling water tables due to excessive pumping has drawn oxygen 
into the aquifers, thus oxidizing sulphides and releasing arsenic. 
7   (http://groups.yahoo.com/group/arsenic-crisis/message/46). Accessed 2 February 
2006. 
8   An approach is also mooted to the International Court of Justice in The Hague 
(Mortoza 2003). 
9   Bronwen Morgan (2004) argues that, while the rhetoric of development aid implies 
generosity, in the lucrative water industry, power and money are always close to issues 
such as privatization of state assets in developing countries. This commodification has 
brought with it bitter contestation from citizen groups (Morgan 2006). 
10   There have also been calls for a World Environmental Organization (Bierman and 
Bauer 2005). 
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11   In negligence, the issue under discussion in the present paper, in British law the 
plaintiff must prove a duty of care, then a breach in that duty and, finally, that loss or 
harm has been suffered. 
12   Holmes enthusiastically based this category on the famous British case of Rylands v 
Fletcher (1868), where a mill owner was held to be liable for the flooding of a mine when 
his reservoir collapsed without warning. 
13   In 2003 BELA was inducted into the United Nations Environment Programme’s 
Global 500 Roll of Honour for pioneering activity in public interest environmental 
litigation. 
14   There is presently a campaign by the Bangladesh Arsenic Mitigation Water Supply 
Project and a host of NGOs to provide alternatives to tubewells.  These include 
improved versions of the traditional dug wells, sand filters to enable the use of pond 
water, and the harvesting of rainwater.  Unfortunately there is evidence of arsenic in dug 
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